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Building Support for Taxation in Developing Countries: Experimental 
Evidence from Mexico 
 
Gustavo A. Flores-Macías 
 
 
Summary 
 
In spite of the importance of taxation for political and economic development, we know 
relatively little about the conditions under which citizens might not exact a political cost on 
leaders for adopting a particular tax. Drawing on insights from the literature on institutional 
design, this article examines how certain features of taxes – such as allowing for civil society 
oversight, sunset provisions that make the duration of taxes finite, and earmark mechanisms 
that direct tax revenue for a specific purpose – affect political support behind them. It also 
evaluates the role of three important aspects of the fiscal exchange, namely trust in 
government, perceptions of the public good, and level of income. Based on an original 
survey experiment focusing on the provision of public safety in Mexico, I find that these 
design features increase political support for taxation, especially among those with low trust 
in government, perceptions of high quality of the public good, and low income. These 
findings have important implications for Mexico, as well as a number of other countries that 
have both low levels of extraction and increased public spending imperatives. 
 
Keywords: tax reform; institutional design; public opinion; earmarking; sunsets; oversight; 
experiment; public safety; developing countries; Mexico. 
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Introduction 
 
Taxation lies at the core of several prominent bodies of literature in the social sciences, 
including those on state capacity, government accountability, economic reform and 
development. From their insights we know that: taxation is a fundamental source of 
resources that can translate into state strength (Brautigam et al. 2008; Schneider 2012); 
taxation results in a link of accountability between citizens and rulers that makes 
governments more responsive (Paler 2013; Prichard 2015; Tilly 2009); it is conducive to 
addressing inequality (de Ferranti et al. 2004; Mahon Jr. 2012) and promoting growth (Bird 
2012); and, for these reasons, taxation is an essential tool for development (Evans 1995; 
Huber 2009; Inter-American Development Bank 2013). Not surprisingly, calls by think-tanks 
(Council of Foreign Relations 2014) and international organisations (Inter-American 
Development Bank 2013; CAF Banco de Desarrollo de América Latina 2012) for increasing 
fiscal extraction in the developing world have gained momentum in recent years. 
 
Yet, in spite of this centrality in the academic literature and the policy world, we know 
relatively little about an important factor behind greater fiscal extraction, namely the 
determinants of public support behind tax reform, particularly in the developing world. This is 
because the conventional focus remains on public attitudes towards compliance – that is, 
reducing evasion (e.g. Cummings et al. 2009; Fjeldstad and Semboja 2001; Torgler 2002, 
2005) – rather than the conditions under which the public is more likely to lend political 
support to fiscal reform. This oversight is consequential, since public support has been found 
to play an important role in determining the adoption of policies – what scholars refer to as 
dynamic representation, or the notion that democratic leaders are responsive to the public 
because their political tenure depends on it (Stimson et al. 1995; Erickson et al. 2002).  
 
This study addresses this lacuna by asking the following questions: What factors affect public 
support for increased taxation? In particular, does support for taxation respond to different 
design features of fiscal reform, including variations in modes of oversight, time horizons and 
expenditure? Are the effects conditional on factors that alter the nature of the fiscal exchange 
between citizens and government, including levels of trust, perceptions of quality of the 
public good, and income?  
 
I answer these questions through an original survey carried out in Mexico, a country that 
ranks among the lowest tax collectors for its level of development (ECLAC 2013), yet has 
important fiscal demands in the form of security imperatives given its ongoing drug-related 
public safety concerns. As such, it is well suited to a study of how states can structure fiscal 
reform in ways that defang, or at least reduce, public opposition. I find that incorporating 
institutional design features meant to reduce uncertainty in the fiscal exchange into the 
design of a tax, such as oversight mechanisms, earmarks and sunset provisions, increases 
political support for increased taxation among the public. The increase in support ranges 
from 5 to 7 percentage points depending on the design feature. Moreover, I find that these 
design features are generally most effective given low trust in government, perception of high 
quality of the public good, and low income. 
 
This novel approach linking institutional design and political support for increased taxation in 
the developing world breaks new ground in several respects. First, it identifies and draws 
attention to an important and underdeveloped aspect of the politics of taxation, namely our 
understanding of the relationship between fiscal reform and public opinion. The literature on 
the politics of taxation in developing countries has focused on events that are beyond 
policymakers’ control. These include crises, such as economic downturns (Bird 1992; 
Sanchez 2006), hyperinflation (Mahon Jr. 2004), banking system failure (Hallerberg and 
Scartascini 2015) and natural disasters (Fairfield 2015); as well as a number of more 
structural factors affecting governments’ ability to tax, including regime type (Cheibub 1998), 
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the economy’s degree of openness and sectoral configuration (Musgrave 1969; Bahl 1971), 
class or group-based power (Best 1976; Fairfield 2010, 2015; Flores-Macías 2014; Richter et 
al. 2009; Timmons 2005), race (Lieberman 2003), ethnicity (Jibao and Prichard 2015), and 
historical legacies (Ondetti 2012, 2015). The emphasis on crises or structural factors has 
come at the expense of our understanding of the conditions under which the public is likely to 
lend political support to fiscal reform.1 
 
Second, this study complements the literature on compliance by contributing to our 
understanding of a step that takes place earlier in time, and before tax obligations are due. 
While studies of compliance focus on why people cheat on their taxes once tax legislation is 
adopted, and tend to emphasise expected penalties and the probability of detection (Alm et 
al. 1992; Slemrod 1992), this study focuses on the determinants of political support regarding 
the adoption of fiscal reform. While understanding the reasons why people evade taxes has 
important implications for extraction, it is just as important to consider the relationship 
between how fiscal policies are designed, and public attitudes on which their adoption and 
sustainability rest. 
 
Third, this article is the first to explore the role of institutional design features for political 
support of taxation in the developing world. Insight from institutional design is commonly 
leveraged in the study of constitutions and electoral rules (Lijphart and Waisman 1996; 
Negretto 2008; Shugart and Carey 1992), corruption (Rose-Ackerman 1978), central bank 
reform (Persson and Tabellini 1993) and public service delivery (Jacobs and Matthews 2015), 
to name a few. This study suggests that design features can also be leveraged to craft more 
palatable taxes in the eyes of the population, providing a fruitful avenue for future research. 
 
Finally, the article is the first to study the fiscal exchange relationship between taxation and 
public safety, showing that the link between the two can potentially be leveraged to generate 
support for fiscal reform. In developing countries where violent crime is on the rise but fiscal 
extraction is low – as in most of Latin America – this can provide an avenue for policymakers 
to address these concerns.  
 
The rest of the study proceeds as follows. First, it situates this research in the literature on 
the importance of public opinion for policymaking in general, and taxation in particular. Next, 
it discusses theoretical applications as to how institutional design features might reduce 
uncertainty in the fiscal exchange – and therefore opposition to taxation – and formulates 
corresponding hypotheses. Third, it discusses the research design, providing details about 
the experimental protocol as well as context for the public safety scenario. The fourth section 
presents results, and the fifth discusses external validity. The last section concludes with 
implications for theory and policy. 
 
 
1  Public opinion and taxation 
 
Stimson et al. (1995) have highlighted the connection between public opinion and 
policymaking: politicians tend to adjust their ideal policy positions as a function of public 
opinion, along with other factors, in order to get closer to an expediency point – where they 
believe they do not jeopardise their chances of re-election. This process shapes policy 
decisions by rational anticipation (Stimson et al. 1995), and can potentially shape electoral 
outcomes if the public’s views are not heeded. This does not mean that mass public opinion 
is the only important factor, or more important than the views of, or pressure exerted by, 
elites. Rather, this suggests that, without public support for a policy, politicians will have a 
                                                        
1  An exception is Fairfield (2013), which suggests strategies for governments to increase tax revenue. However, its 
emphasis is on economic elites rather than political support among the general public.  
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harder time advancing their agenda: legislators face electoral disincentives to go against 
their constituents, and executives will have trouble garnering legislative majorities.  
 
The question is whether this logic extends to all policies, or whether some areas of public 
policy are more removed from public attitudes than others. One camp suggests that public 
opinion does not matter for the adoption of tax policy; instead, distributive battles are waged 
among elites, and voters are not relevant in the process (Alesina and Drazen 1991). This 
perspective would point to the expansion of the tax base in Latin America through regressive 
Value Added Tax (VAT) over the last thirty years as evidence that voters are not relevant in 
determining tax policy, given that this policy favours economic elites at the expense of the 
bulk of the population. The same could be said about Europe, where corporate taxes have 
been reduced and consumption taxes have gone up, neither of which would appear to be in 
the interest of most survey respondents.  
  
A competing and more persuasive perspective suggests that even the best policies fail in the 
absence of the right political conditions to make them amenable to the public and sustainable 
over time (Haggard and Webb 1994; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Armijo and Faucher 2002). 
With an emphasis on structural reform during the 1980s and 1990s, a large literature points 
to the importance of support among the population as a key factor for the political realisation 
of economic transformation in Africa, Eastern Europe and Latin America (Baker 2003, 2009; 
Bratton et al. 2004; Buendía 1996; Johnson and Kowalska 1994; Przeworski 1996; Stokes 
1996, 2001; Weyland 1998).  
 
On tax policy in particular, scholars have observed that tax reform is closely related to 
legislative battles over the distributional consequences of policies (de Ferranti et al. 2004), 
and public attitudes play a significant role in determining whether an additional tax burden is 
adopted, at least in a democracy (Fjeldstad el al. 2012). This is the case because of the 
electoral recourse of citizens whenever they deem the tax burden excessive or unfair. 
Disenchanted citizens can express their discontent at the ballot box, which makes office 
holders receptive to the views of the population (Stimson et al. 1995). Unless the public is 
willing, leaders increase extraction at their peril – which compromises the government’s 
ability to increase the provision of quality public goods. Ideally, then, they would generate 
revenue under conditions of public support.  
 
Although elites naturally play an important role in outlining the tax policy agenda, there is 
evidence that public opinion also plays a role in shaping tax reform: office holders both seek 
information about the public’s attitudes, and tend to act accordingly. For example, 
experimental research in the United States has shown that legislators who are aware of their 
constituents’ views through public opinion surveys tend to vote in line with those views 
(Butler and Nickerson 2011). In Chile, the Piñera administration relied on public opinion polls 
to evaluate whether to raise taxes on corporations in 2010 (Fairfield 2015: 266). In Mexico, 
Presidents Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) and Felipe Calderón (2006-2012) commissioned 
surveys in 1999 and 2012 to evaluate the support behind proposed tax measures (Casar 
2013).  
 
There is also evidence that policymakers act on this information by advancing, altering or 
withholding altogether fiscal reform because of public opinion. Cases in point are reforms 
whose political success or failure has hinged on the public’s views, regardless of whether the 
outcome might translate into good public policy or benefit its supporters. In the United States, 
for instance, although the 2001 and 2003 Bush tax cuts generated a ‘massive upward 
transfer of wealth’ from the poor to the rich, they were adopted because of the broad support 
the measure enjoyed among the ordinary Americans who would least benefit from it (Bartels 
2005: 16). Similarly, generalised public support largely contributed to repealing the estate tax, 
even though it only affected the wealthiest 1 or 2 per cent of taxpayers (Bartels 2005). In 
Colombia, legislators of the Liberal Party pointed to the public’s opposition to increasing VAT 
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as the main justification for blocking the measure in Congress and supporting other types of 
taxes instead (Flores-Macías 2014). In Mexico, the administrations of Vicente Fox (2000-
2006) and Felipe Calderón pushed for increases in VAT revenue, but public opposition 
derailed these governments’ plans in 2001 and 2007, and watered them down considerably 
in 2009. More recently, Enrique Peña Nieto’s (2012-present) government intended to adopt 
VAT for food, medicine, tuition and mortgages in 2013, but decided to pull the measure in the 
face of 70 per cent disapproval (CNN Mexico 2013; Romero 2015).2 
 
To be sure, governments might still carry out unpopular reforms, but not without a political 
cost. Executives and legislators investigate public attitudes through both commissioned and 
publicly-available surveys, make reference to them when making appeals to support or 
oppose fiscal reform, and act on this information by adjusting their behaviour – whether 
tailoring tax initiatives accordingly or informing their vote. Given the high stakes characteristic 
of fiscal reform, re-election-minded politicians have every incentive to pay attention to the 
public’s views on initiatives that might become politically toxic. The more popular reforms are, 
the more political cover policymakers will enjoy when adopting them.  
 
 
2  Institutional design and political support for 
taxation 
 
Against the backdrop of political elites being attentive to public attitudes about tax policy, the 
question arises as to whether particular tax structures are more or less likely to attract public 
support. In other words, to what extent does institutional design – the creation of ‘rules and 
incentives […] to achieve substantive goals’ (Weimer 1985: 8) – affect individual attitudes by 
creating incentives or disincentives to offer support (Olsen 1997)? In the context of 
constitutional design, for example, scholars have found that particular rules are important in 
preserving democracy by giving relevant parties a stake in the system (Lijphart and Waisman 
1996; Shugart and Carey 1992), and electoral rule design has been found to shape the 
strength and number of parties in the system (Negretto 2008; Powell 1989). Similarly, the 
field of behavioural economics has pointed to the importance of choice architecture – or how 
the way choices are presented can influence people’s decisions (Thaler and Sunstein 2009). 
Research evaluating the consequences of specific institutional features, holding other things 
equal, has focused on corruption (Rose-Ackerman 1978), the political control of 
administrative agencies (McCubbins et al. 1989), the economic consequences of the 
independence of central banks (Persson and Tabellini 1993), and the effects of budgetary 
rules on deficits (von Hagen 1992).  
 
There are different ways in which institutional design features contribute to reducing the 
incentives to oppose a policy initiative. In particular, institutional design might help to reduce 
the asymmetries between principal and agents – such as citizens and governments – or 
reduce the inter-temporal uncertainty involved in bearing the costs today for the promise of 
uncertain rewards in the future. Among the main strategies to achieve these objectives is to 
incorporate transparency or diligence requirements, automating policy decisions, and 
restricting the agenda to make commitments credible (Weimer 1985, 1992).  
 
Transparency or diligence requirements help to reduce the uncertainty that an agent might 
not be fulfilling a task consistent with the interest of the principal (Weimer 1985). Such 
requirements are common in attempts to reduce government officials’ discretion, or prevent 
them from engaging in illegal behaviour, such as corruption. Examples range from the 
                                                        
2  The 2013 reform did equalise the VAT rate across states, eliminating the lower rate enjoyed along the border with the 
US. 
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requirement that certain rules be visible at all times as a reminder of desirable behaviour or 
outcomes, to the formation of oversight committees in charge of monitoring activities.  
 
Automating policy decisions helps to reduce uncertainty about future outcomes by reducing 
discretion (Rodrik and Zechhauser 1988). Such design features are meant to bring clarity to 
the policy process, since the steps in a sequence of events is predetermined. Examples 
range from tying a programme’s eligibility requirements to an established criterion (e.g. the 
poverty line determines eligibility for Food Stamp programmes), to incorporating an explicit 
end to the duration of a policy to allow for its re-evaluation (e.g. adopting sunset provisions) 
(Weimer 1992).  
 
Restricting the policy agenda also contributes to reducing uncertainty (Rodrik and 
Zechhauser 1988). These provisions can tie governments’ hands to prevent future changes 
in leadership, ideology, or priorities altering agreements reached today. The most common 
example is to guarantee that revenue is necessarily channelled to a particular programme – 
what is often referred to as earmarking. In short, institutional design features can reduce 
uncertainty by addressing discretion of government officials in the policymaking process that 
might threaten the benefits envisioned by the population.  
 
As in the other fields of study mentioned above, these institutional design strategies might 
play a role in ameliorating the misalignment of incentives between re-election-minded office 
holders pushing for reform, and a public opposed to bearing a greater fiscal burden today for 
the promise of public goods in the future. In particular, design features that enhance 
credibility, shorten time horizons in case the policy is misguided, and restrict the agenda 
could reduce uncertainty and increase political support for fiscal reform today.  
 
First, regarding transparency and diligence requirements, taxpayers’ ability to follow how 
resources are spent has been associated with greater willingness to pay taxes (Elster 1989; 
OECD 2008; Prichard 2010; Scholz and Lubell 1998). Although governments tend to have 
oversight mechanisms – auditors, legislative committees and comptrollers, among others – 
to monitor the performance and financial probity of other agencies, in developing countries 
these efforts are often considered insufficient and in need of complementary citizens’ action 
to oversee government activity (Goetz and Jenkins 2001). 
 
To reduce the uncertainty that tax revenue might be embezzled, wasted, or spent 
inappropriately, non-governmental or civil society oversight can add a layer of credibility to 
assuage these concerns. Examples of civil society oversight range from ‘people’s audits’ of 
local government expenditure by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in India (Goetz 
and Jenkins 2001), to NGO groups analysing security budgets in Argentina (UNDP 2008), to 
prominent members of civil society, such as university presidents and business leaders, 
monitoring how tax revenue from a wealth tax is spent in El Salvador (Flores-Macías 2015). 
 
Second, regarding automating policy decisions, sunset provisions can reduce uncertainty 
about the fiscal exchange by shortening the time horizon of the tax burden. Although not 
without detractors, who blame sunset provisions for biasing policymaking towards the status 
quo at the expense of meaningful change (Rhee Baum and Bawn 2011; Viswanathan 2007: 
672), sunset provisions stand to increase political support for taxation. Since they force 
legislatures to reevaluate the consequences of their actions after a period of time and allow 
for the possibility of adjustment (Deran 1965), short-lived taxes can provide hope that the 
additional burden will be brief. For example, Fairfield (2015), suggests that an automatic 
sunset provision included in a tax reform package was instrumental in reducing the 
opposition of business elites to President Sebastian Piñera’s fiscal reform package. Similarly, 
Flores-Macías (2014) points to a three-year sunset clause facilitating the adoption of wealth 
taxes in Colombia since 2002.  
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Third, the restriction of the policy agenda as a strategy to reduce taxpayers’ uncertainty can 
be achieved through earmarking – that is, establishing a clear link between tax revenue and 
expenditure (Bahiigwa et al. 2004). Although detractors point to their rigidity over time 
(McCleary and Uribe Tobon 1990), and governments’ failure to allocate resources according 
to earmarks in practice (McCleary 1991), earmarked taxes can protect social priorities from 
budget crunches and political fluctuations (Eklund 1969). Earmarks are likely to be more 
popular among the public because they allow for a policy outcome that might be closer to 
individuals’ preferences (Buchanan 1963; Fairfield 2013). In the developing world, where 
weak institutions are a concern, earmarking tax revenue can provide taxpayers some level of 
assurance that funds will be used for their intended purpose. As Teja (1988: 531) has 
pointed out, earmarking can ‘substitute for lack of representative power in the executive and 
legislative branches of government’. In Latin America, countries such as Colombia, Costa 
Rica and Honduras have also earmarked specific taxes for the purposes of public safety 
(Flores-Macías 2015).  
 
Thus, building on insight from the literature on institutional design, three hypotheses follow 
about the relationship between the structure of a proposed tax policy and public support for 
that proposal.  
 
H1:  Support for additional taxation will increase when an oversight mechanism is 
incorporated into the design of the tax. 
H2:  Support for additional taxation will increase when a sunset provision is incorporated 
into the design of the tax. 
H3:  Support for additional taxation will increase when the tax revenue is explicitly 
earmarked as part of the design of the tax. 
 
Heterogeneous effects: trust, quality of the public good, and income 
 
While these institutional design features might help to address uncertainty that future benefits 
might not materialise after bearing the fiscal burden today, their effect is likely to vary among 
certain groups of the population. First, the literature on taxation suggests that trust in 
government is important for fiscal extraction (Slemrod 2002). In developing countries with a 
history of government corruption, as in Latin America, the public tends to be especially 
sceptical about their taxes being spent as intended. Whether individuals trust the government 
or not is likely to shape whether the three institutional design features discussed earlier are 
able to increase political support for a greater tax burden. Less trusting individuals are likely 
to be more cynical about the potential benefits of greater taxation (Bergman 2002; Fjeldstad 
and Semboja 2001; Prichard 2010). Because of their mistrust in government, they may not 
consider these design features realistic or meaningful. People who mistrust the government 
might believe these mechanisms are a sham, and that they will not ultimately enjoy the 
benefits. Therefore, their views are likely to be less affected by the three institutional design 
mechanisms – monitoring, earmarks and sunset provisions – given that their success 
requires confidence that the government will actually execute the measures.  
 
A second factor potentially affecting support for increased taxation is people’s perception of 
the public good provided by the government. As Levi (1988), Timmons (2005) and others 
have argued, there is an expectation that comes with handing over part of one’s wealth to the 
government. When individuals perceive their taxes to be at work, they may feel they are 
getting a fair fiscal exchange (Fjeldstad and Semboja 2001; Lledo et al. 2004; Moore 2004, 
2008). Accordingly, government effectiveness in spending taxpayers’ resources to achieve 
stated goals has been associated with citizens’ support for taxation (OECD 2008). It follows 
that the level of satisfaction with the fiscal exchange will contribute to determining people’s 
support for increased taxation. Individuals feeling shortchanged in the exchange will likely be 
less supportive of increases in the tax burden.  
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A third area of heterogeneity to be considered is the level of income. State-society relations 
in the developing world tend to be especially asymmetric among low-income groups 
compared to their wealthier counterparts, because wealthier sectors enjoy more leverage to 
influence policy outcomes (Fairfield 2015). Wealthier groups have better resources to both 
shape tax policymaking and to find ways to reduce their tax obligation once policy has been 
set, whereas low-income sectors tend to be less empowered to demand benefits in 
exchange for their taxes. Therefore, institutional design features might have a greater effect 
on reducing uncertainty in the fiscal exchange among lower-income sectors.  
 
Given these potential differences in the terms of the fiscal exchange based on trust, 
perception of the public good and income, a second set of hypotheses follows:  
 
H4:  The effect of the three institutional design features on support for increased taxation 
will be lower among people who mistrust the government. 
H5:  The effect of the three institutional design features on support for increased taxation 
will be lower among people who perceive low quality in the provision of the public good. 
H6:  The effect of the three institutional design features on support for increased taxation 
will be lower among wealthier sectors.  
 
 
3  Research design 
 
I evaluate these hypotheses in the context of a survey experiment conducted in Mexico. 
Experiments allow researchers to vary certain treatment conditions that may not be possible 
to observe simultaneously in a particular context – for example, one cannot observe 
individuals’ support for taxes with and without certain tax rules at the same time. Additionally, 
when properly randomised, they allow researchers to attribute causal effects to the 
experimental manipulations and determine the magnitude of these effects (Druckman et al. 
2006). This design allows us to transcend correlations-based research that has characterised 
public opinion studies, while responding to the call for research on the key determinants of 
tax attitudes in developing countries (Fjeldstad et al. 2012). The findings allow us to 
determine which design factors are causally relevant in shaping attitudes towards increased 
taxation, the size of their effect, and whether effects are conditional on features relevant to 
the fiscal exchange.  
 
An established polling firm – Data Opinión Pública y Mercados, which has experience 
conducting surveys among nationally-representative samples in Mexico – conducted the 
experimental survey. The survey experiment was conducted through face-to-face 
interactions at the respondents’ home, drawn from a nationally representative probability-
based random sample of 1,300 respondents. Contrary to the use of online or telephone 
surveys, frequent in developed countries because of the generalised availability of these 
services, survey research among a representative sample in developing countries often 
requires face-to-face interactions at the respondents’ home. Because of the oral nature of the 
survey, the experimental treatments were kept relatively brief and straightforward.  
 
Randomisation of treatments took place independently of the sampling process, and the 
likelihood of being assigned to a particular treatment was the same for all respondents in a 
sampling unit.3 Consequently, there is little concern for high intra-class correlation 
coefficients. A table showing descriptive statistics for each treatment condition is shown in 
the Appendix. 
 
                                                        
3  A computer randomised the version of the questionnaire assigned to each respondent. Respondents were drawn from 
Mexico’s national voting registry.  
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3.1 Case and public good selection: Mexico’s public safety 
 
Mexico’s low levels of taxation make this country a useful case to test these hypotheses. 
With one of the lowest tax-to-GDP ratios (11 per cent) among middle-income countries, 
Mexicans historically have borne a low tax burden compared to its potential (ECLAC 2013). 
As Figure 1 shows, Mexico has one of the largest gaps between the expected fiscal 
extraction for its level of income (solid line in Figure 1) and its actual extraction. The country’s 
natural resource wealth – which generates a third of government revenue – has provided an 
alternative to taxation, making it harder to justify tax increases. Not surprisingly, when asked 
about the existing tax burden, 58 per cent of Mexicans say it is too high, 27 per cent about 
right, and 4 per cent too low – this is comparable to views in the United States, which has a 
strong anti-taxation tradition. Thus, Mexico is a case where the public is used to paying a low 
tax burden, making changes in public support more difficult, but which – as with most of Latin 
America – stands to benefit considerably from increased fiscal revenue.  
 
Figure 1 Tax-to-GDP ratio by GDP per capita, 2013 
 
Source: IMF Government Finance Statistics and World Bank World Development Indicators Online.  
 
I selected security as a concrete public good in which to ground the experiment, both 
because of its importance in the hierarchy of public goods and because of its salience in 
Mexico and the rest of Latin America. Although there tends to be considerable disagreement, 
often related to ideological positions, as to what constitutes the core functions of the state – 
that is, whether the state should be involved in providing such services as health care and 
education, and to what extent – there is a consensus regarding the centrality of public safety 
as one of the state’s main functions (Tilly 2009). Without public safety, other important 
functions, such as allowing markets to function, cannot be even minimally performed.  
 
Further, security is considered to be the main problem facing Mexico. More than 42 per cent 
of respondents in a survey discussed below mentioned security-related issues, such as 
public safety, drug trafficking and crime, with public safety as the most common response (27 
per cent). In contrast, 22 per cent pointed to the economy as the main problem, and 17 per 
cent to unemployment. Of those responding an economic issue as the main ailment, about 
half recorded public safety as the second main problem for the country. This concern for 
public safety as the main problem facing the country is not atypical: it is consistent with the 
views in a majority of countries in Latin America (Latinobarometer 2013). 
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3.2 Experimental conditions 
 
In the experiment, respondents were randomly assigned to one of four groups – three 
treatments and a control – to test hypotheses corresponding to the three tax design factors 
associated with individual support for taxation: a) oversight, b) sunset and c) earmark 
provisions. The control group was told that, in light of recent debates about public safety, 
some experts recommended increasing public safety expenditure, and that one proposal to 
do so was to raise taxes. Respondents were then asked: with this proposal in mind, to what 
extent would you support paying more in taxes than you currently do. Treatment groups were 
given the same information, but were asked the extent to which they would support paying 
more in taxes than they currently do if: a committee of respected civil society members 
oversaw how the tax revenue were spent / the new taxes disappeared in 3 years and 
Congress was forced to debate them again / the additional tax revenue was used exclusively 
for public safety. 
 
Along with the experimental treatments, other items in the survey allow us to evaluate 
heterogeneous effects. Respondents were asked about their trust in the government, 
perceptions of public safety in their community, and their income. The full text of the 
questions is included in the Appendix.  
 
 
4  Results 
 
The experiment’s results support the hypotheses that these institutional design features can 
indeed generate political support for taxation. Net support – those who changed their views 
from opposition to support – increased from a baseline of about 17 per cent in the control 
group to about 22 per cent with civil society oversight (H1), 24 per cent for a sunset provision 
(H2), and 24 per cent with earmarking (H3). Thus, these design features increased support 
by between 6 and 7 points, depending on the treatment (Figure 2). In relative terms, this 
represents an increase of between 31 and 38 per cent with respect to the 17 percentage 
point baseline of support. The treatment involving civil society oversight appears to enjoy 
slightly lower levels of support compared to including a sunset provision or earmarking, but 
estimates of change in support for the three design features fall roughly within the same 
confidence interval and cannot be differentiated statistically.  
 
Figure 2 Average treatment effects compared to baseline  
 
NB: Circles represent estimates for the treatment effects. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Tests are one-tailed 
because of the direction of the hypotheses. 
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To put these magnitudes in perspective, whereas only 4 per cent of the population expresses 
support for increased taxation when asked whether the tax burden should increase in the 
abstract – a share comparable to that in the United States – support reached 17 per cent 
once increased taxation was discussed in the context of public safety. This support further 
increased to up to 24 per cent when specific design features were mentioned. Support for 
taxation was slightly higher when earmarks and sunset provisions were included as part of 
the architecture of the tax, compared to monitoring by civil society groups, although the 
difference between treatments was not large enough to be statistically significant. Given that 
the scenario presented to all respondents was related to public safety, the 7-point effect of 
earmarking might be understated and therefore represent a lower bound.  
 
Regarding conditional effects, the results do not support the hypothesis (H4) that the effect of 
the institutional design will be lower among respondents reporting low levels of trust in the 
government. Instead, they provide some suggestive evidence to the contrary.4 Whereas the 
effect of the treatments is small and decidedly not significant among the high trust group, 
among the low trust group the effect of earmarks is large (13 points) and significant, and the 
effect of sunsets is large (9 points) and barely missing significance (Figure 3). The effect of 
monitoring is not significant in either group, but the estimate is twice as large in the low trust 
group. This suggests that the design features might be especially effective in reducing 
uncertainty among those who are most sceptical of the government.  
 
Figure 3 Conditional effects, trust in government 
 
NB: Circles represent estimates for the treatment effects. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Tests are one-tailed 
because of the direction of the hypotheses. 
 
The results lend evidence to support the hypothesis (H5) that the effect of the institutional 
design features will be lower among those who perceive the public good provision to be 
deficient.5 Whereas no institutional design feature reached significance among those who 
perceive their community to be unsafe, the effect was greater among those who expressed 
                                                        
4  In order to evaluate this hypothesis, those who expressed they had little or no trust in government were grouped in the 
low trust category, whereas those who expressed some or a lot of trust in government were grouped in the high trust 
category.  
5  Respondents who expressed feeling very unsafe or somewhat unsafe in their community formed the unsafe group, 
whereas those who expressed feeling very safe or somewhat safe formed the safe group.    
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their community to be safe, and significant for the civil society oversight and earmark 
treatments – the sunset treatment barely missed significance (Figure 4). This suggests that 
those who perceive they have benefited from the provision of the public good – in this case 
public safety – are more responsive to the influence of institutional design features as a 
means to increase support for additional taxes.  
 
Figure 4 Conditional effects, perception of public good  
 
NB: Circles represent estimates for the treatment effects. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Tests are one-tailed 
because of the direction of the hypotheses. 
 
Finally, the results provide some support for the hypothesis (H6) that the effect of the 
institutional design features will be lower among wealthier sectors.6 Whereas no treatment is 
significant among the wealthy, among the lower-income group the effects of sunset and 
earmark provisions were large – 11 and 10 points, respectively – and significant (Figure 5). 
These results suggest that those who are less empowered to demand benefits in exchange 
for their taxes are more responsive to the uncertainty-reducing institutional design features.  
 
  
                                                        
6  Respondents with self-reported income below the median formed the low-income group, whereas those with self-
reported income above the median formed the high-income group.  
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Figure 5 Conditional effects, income 
 
NB: Circles represent estimates for the treatment effects. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Tests are one-tailed 
because of the direction of the hypotheses. 
 
Overall, earmark provisions had a significant effect given groups with low trust, favourable 
perceptions of public safety, and lower income. Sunset provisions were similar, except that 
they barely missed significance among the groups with low trust and perceptions of a safe 
community. Civil society monitoring was only significant among the group with favourable 
perceptions of the public good.  
 
 
5  External validity 
 
Although experimental research provides many advantages for inference, one of the main 
pitfalls associated with it is the lack of external validity (Druckman et al. 2006). This study is 
externally valid in the following ways. First, by surveying respondents through a nationally 
representative, probability-based sample, there is greater confidence that results are 
reflective of the attitudes of the population in the entire country – as opposed to 
unrepresentative convenience samples – both for levels of support, as well as the 
magnitudes of the average treatment effects.  
 
Second, several features provide ecological validity – that is, how closely the experiment 
approximates reality. The experiment draws on a realistic scenario that is of importance for 
the public, and has already materialised in several Latin American countries. Not only has 
public safety become the main public concern in most Latin American countries in recent 
years, but also taxes related to public safety have recently been adopted or discussed in 
several countries, including Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. 
The specifics of the three treatments – an oversight committee of respected civil society, a 
three-year sunset period, and earmarking for public safety – are drawn from actual examples 
in these countries. That more countries increasingly face these challenges suggests the 
findings are relevant not just for Mexico, but across the developing world.  
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Further, the exercise resembles what takes place when a fiscal reform is considered: polling 
firms ask citizens about their views on a series of proposed measures, and citizens in turn 
express their support or opposition. These surveys take place prospectively – that is, before 
the measure is adopted – to determine how much political support the measures might enjoy. 
Contrary to experiments on compliance, the actual payment of taxes does not have to be 
involved in order to approximate reality, since political support for a measure is not 
expressed on the day taxes are due, but around the time the measure is proposed and 
debated.7 In fact, a person might support a tax and therefore contribute to making it politically 
palatable, regardless of whether the person fulfills her tax obligations down the road or 
whether she is even affected by the tax. In short, although actual taxes are not at stake in the 
experiment, the situation resembles the type of survey that governments and legislatures 
employ to evaluate the degree of political support a measure enjoys.    
 
Additionally, because of the questionnaire constraints involved in face-to-face interviews – 
where respondents cannot take their time to read an experimental treatment at their leisure 
as in online surveys – the experimental treatments were very subtle. That the treatments 
were able to move public support in spite of this suggests that these effects might be 
understated compared to the stronger exposure to the different design features that is likely 
to take place in reality. These institutional designs could very well have a greater effect in 
ameliorating the public’s concerns when the stakes are higher with an actual reform.  
 
Finally, this study does not allow us to determine whether these effects hold for other types 
of goods. It might very well be that public safety is unique, and people are less willing to pay 
for public education or healthcare. However, because of the importance of public safety for 
publics across the region and the tall order in the hierarchy of public goods provided by the 
state, the study of public safety makes a valuable contribution as a first step towards 
understanding political support for other types of goods.  
 
 
6  Conclusion 
 
Contrary to the traditional focus on crises, structural factors or compliance, this study shifted 
the emphasis for the study of tax reform in the developing world towards the public opinion 
underpinnings of political support for tax reform. Consistent with research that has shown 
that making economic reform politically palatable can be a difficult proposition (Murillo 2001; 
Weyland 1998), animosity towards greater extraction tends to run high regardless of the 
setting – Mexico is no exception. However, the findings presented here suggest that this 
animosity is not fixed. Instead, relatively simple design features of a tax can make a 
difference for making reform more palatable to the public – although by themselves they are 
not enough to generate overwhelming support, if there is ever such a thing for taxation.  
 
In addition to suggesting that the public is likely to respond favourably to measures that 
reduce the uncertainty inherent in prospective economic reform through provisions related to 
oversight, sunset and earmark mechanisms, the findings also speak to the effect of the 
distributional consequences of taxation, highlighting the groups for which institutional design 
features are most effective in generating political support for tax reform. In particular, the 
result that those with low levels of trust in the government were especially affected by sunset 
and earmarking provisions runs counter to the expectation that they would be the most 
cynical about the prospect of bearing a greater fiscal burden (Slemrod 2002). That these 
provisions were also most effective among the lower-income group, suggests that they could 
                                                        
7  For example, it is not difficult to imagine a real-life scenario in which a person is supportive of a tax when it is first 
debated and adopted, but has changed her mind when taxes are due. The first one has to do with political support for 
the adoption of reforms – the focus of this study – whereas the second is related to compliance. 
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potentially become a way to empower those sectors. The findings also lend support to the 
view that perceptions of a fair fiscal exchange matter (Fjeldstad and Semboja 2001; Lledo et 
al. 2004; Moore 2004, 2008), even for a relatively abstract public good such as public safety.  
 
These results should open the door to further research based on insights from institutional 
design and behavioural economics in order to make fiscal reform politically palatable. As 
institutional design features reduce uncertainty about the benefits associated with fiscal 
reform, taxation will become more appealing to the public and increasing fiscal resources will 
become less threatening to elected officials.  
 
Indeed, as public safety has become one of the public’s main concerns across the 
developing world (Afrobarometer 2013; Latinobarometer 2013), many governments have 
struggled to find the fiscal resources necessary to fund increasingly demanding security 
efforts while maintaining prevailing levels of spending in other areas. In particular, low levels 
of taxation in many developing countries have impaired governments’ ability to invest in 
alleviating poverty, improving security forces and administering justice, all of which are 
crucial for the provision of public safety in particular, and the strengthening of the state more 
generally.  
 
As in Mexico, many other countries in the region are faced with the dual challenge of low 
fiscal extraction and deteriorating public safety. On the one hand, there is an increasing 
realisation of the importance of second-generation reform (Naim 1994; Pastor and Wise 
1999), taxation being one of the most prominent (Huber 2009). On the other, the region is the 
most violent in the world, and public safety is the main or second most important concern in 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela (Latinobarometer 
2013). Although the results here rely on a public safety scenario and may not apply to other 
goods, they are suggestive of an avenue to extract additional revenue. Future work should 
evaluate whether these findings apply to other types of public goods, and whether 
combinations of these institutional design features might have an additive effect.  
 
The findings presented here suggest that the determinants of political support for increased 
taxation might not necessarily be the same as those of tax compliance. In particular, 
although perceptions of quality of the public good (Alm et al. 1992) and trust in government 
(Fauvelle-Aymar 1999) seem to play a role in both cases, other factors point in different 
directions. For example, whereas compliance research has found that how income is 
generated is important but not the level of income (Kirchler et al. 2008; Park and Hyun 2003), 
the level of income did play a role in shaping the effect of institutional design treatments on 
public support for increased taxation.  
 
These findings should be read with two caveats in mind. First, understanding the specific 
context of countries matters. In particular, the fiscal consequences of different types of 
design features should be taken into consideration. Earmarking as a way to increase public 
support behind taxation, and in turn generate political support, may be appropriate in some 
settings, but sunset provisions may be appropriate for others.8 Given the inability to extract 
adequate levels of resources from society in many developing countries, the disadvantages 
of these design features should be weighed against the advantages of reducing resistance to 
fiscal extraction.  
 
Second, the findings should not be interpreted as suggesting that increased taxation is the 
only or most important goal in the abstract. Efforts to make public spending more effective 
                                                        
8  For example, some governments face legal impediments for earmarking. However, some have found ways to 
circumvent constitutional restrictions by adopting de facto earmarks, as with President Alvaro Uribe’s wealth taxes in 
Colombia.    
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are equally important for good governance, and should be made a priority as well. Rather, 
the insights presented here regarding the effects of the three design features of taxes on 
public support for taxation should contribute to expanding the political toolkit aimed at 
strengthening the fiscal sphere of the state in the developing world. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 Experimental treatments 
 
You may have heard discussions about public safety in Mexico. Some experts suggest 
increasing spending in public safety, including in policing, the judicial system and crime 
prevention.  
 
One proposal to achieve this is to collect more in taxes. 
 
[Insert treatment here] 
 
Treatments 
 
1. Baseline 
 
With this proposal in mind, to what extent would you support paying more in taxes than you 
currently do? 
 
2. Oversight 
 
With this proposal in mind, to what extent would you support paying more in taxes than you 
currently do, if a committee of respected civil society members oversaw how the tax revenue 
was spent? 
 
3. Sunset 
 
With this proposal in mind, to what extent would you support paying more in taxes than you 
currently do, if the new taxes disappeared in three years and Congress was forced to debate 
them again?  
 
4. Earmark 
 
With this proposal in mind, to what extent would you support paying more in taxes than you 
currently do, if the additional tax revenue was used exclusively for public safety? 
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Appendix 2 Randomisation check: Means across treatments and one-way Anova 
Variable Control Monitoring Earmark Sunset One-way Anova (p 
value) 
Age 41.2 40.8 40.6 40.8 0.97 
Education 9.0 8.8 9.1 8.8 0.73 
Female 0.48 0.52 0.52 0.47 0.42 
Income 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.0 0.66 
Perception safety 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 0.47 
Tax burden 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.6 0.37 
Trust 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.4 0.07 
Urban 0.24 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.55 
 
 
 
Appendix 3 Summary statistics 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
Support for increased 
taxation 
1250 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Age  1279 40.8 15.4 18 84 
Education  1298 8.9 4.0 0 22 
Female 1300 0.5 0.5 0 1 
Income 1085 3.05 1.21 1 8 
Perception safety 1294 2.5 0.90 1 4 
Tax burden 1164 2.6 0.58 1 3 
Trust 1297 2.7 0.89 1 4 
Urban 1300 0.26 0.43 0 1 
 
 
 
Appendix 4 Results for Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5 
 
Average treatment effects 
Level of support 
Experimental condition  (%) 
Control  17 
Monitoring  23 
Earmark  24 
Sunset  24 
Effects from difference in Means Test and 95% CI 
Monitoring  
6 
(0.1 to 11) 
Earmark  
7 
(1 to 12) 
Sunset  
7 
(1 to 12) 
NB: Tests are one-tailed because of the direction of the hypotheses. 
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Conditional effects, trust in government 
Level of support (%) 
Experimental condition  Low trust  High trust 
Control  24  13 
Monitoring  30  16 
Earmark  37  14 
Sunset  33  16 
Effects from difference in Means Test and 95% CI 
Monitoring  
6 
(-3 to 15) 
 
 
3 
(-3 to 9) 
Earmark  
13 
(4 to 23) 
 
 
1 
(-5 to 6) 
Sunset  
9 
(-0.3 to 18) 
 
 
3 
(-4 to 9) 
NB: Tests are one-tailed because of the direction of the hypotheses. 
 
Conditional effects, perceptions of public good 
Level of support (%) 
Experimental condition  Unsafe community  Safe community 
Control  20  14 
Monitoring  21  24 
Earmark  26  22 
Sunset  26  21 
Effects from difference in Means Test and 95% CI 
Monitoring  
1 
(9 to 6) 
 
 
10 
(2 to 18) 
Earmark  
6 
(-2 to 13) 
 
 
8 
(0.3 to 15) 
Sunset  
6 
(-2 to 14) 
 
 
7 
(-0.05 to 15) 
NB: Tests are one-tailed because of the direction of the hypotheses. 
 
Conditional effects, income 
Level of support (%) 
Experimental conditions  Low income  High income 
Control  11  26 
Monitoring  13  36 
Earmark  21  26 
Sunset  22  21 
Effects from difference in Means Test and 95% CI 
Monitoring  
2 
(-4 to 8) 
 
 
10 
(-1 to 21) 
Earmark  
10 
(3 to 17) 
 
 
0 
(-10 to 10) 
Sunset  
11 
(4 to 18) 
 
 
6 
(-5 to 17) 
NB: Tests are one-tailed because of the direction of the hypotheses. 
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